Abstract-Distributed generation as attached to market liberalization requires pricing schemes able to deliver the appropriate incentives to market participants. In particular. users should be made responsible for their reactive power. A penalty system fails in that account. One of the major challenges in setting up an appropriate pricing of reactive power consists in identifying its attached costs. Although their peculiar structure might suggest as appropriate a separate treatment of real and reactive power, we argue for a joint approach. In fact, what matters is the total financial burden each user has to support, not the way it is actually computed. A fairness criteria is Introduced, according to which no user or group of users should contribute more than its stand-alone cost. When contributions exactly cover total costs, this implies that no user is a burden to the others. We evidence that this criteria is nonsensical if applied to only part of the costs. We conclude by proposing a pricing rule that always complies with our fairness requirements. Its practical implementation is presented and applied to an illustrative example. Tariff penalties for lack of power factor compensation are analyzed for two energy suppliers, one in Europe, the other in North America. They are shown to (possibly) fail to comply with our fairness criteria.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of deregulation and in presence of market players with heterogeneous characteristics, a proper pricing of the different dimensions of electrical services is needed. In particular, in order to send the proper signals to the market, it may appear appropriate to account explicitly for reactive power in pricing energy. Some of the attached challenges are presented in [1]- [8] .
Reactive power is almost never explicitly priced. In most cases, tariff penalties are applied to induce utilities or users to display power factors close to one. Yet, absent penalties, system costs attached to reactive power are aggregated to other costs and covered by active power prices. Limitations of penalties have already been discussed and pointed out (See e.g. [9] ). In particular, it is plain that penalty rules do not result in any incentives for users to reduce their reactive power consumption, when the latter is below the associated threshold.
While the need for reactive power pricing has been recognized for long, it is still the object of constant research. This This paper was written while the first author was visiting the department of Economics, at University of Montreal, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
Chumna Francis Mugomnbozi ltcole Polytechnique de Montreal, Universit6 de Montreal. Email: francis.mc@ieee.org is especially the case in the domain of real-time pricing. In most approaches however, real and reactive power pricing are considered as completely separate problems. Infrastructure, operation and maintenance (O&M) and other fixed costs are attributed to each dimension in an almost ad hoc way. Production (variable) costs are computed in a separate manner (See again [1] - [4] , [8] ). It is nevertheless clear that both (i) capacity of the power grid (hence capital and O&M costs) and (ii) production costs depend upon the amount of exchange and transit of both active and reactive energy. This follows respectively from thermal limitation of the grid and voltage stability requirements.
Following work by Hao and Alexpapapoulos [10], we argue that active and reactive power pricing ought be considered jointly. As evidenced by [10] , the costs of providing reactive and real power are so embedded that it is difficult to independently allocate one or the other. This follows in particular from the impossibility to allocate to either service the net capacity of generators to provide MVA power. While the concept of opportunity cost (obtained by considering the case when no real power is consumed, see [9] ) is still useful to provide some insights, a proper cost allocation method should consider all the dimensions of the joint-production process. This is all the more true for reactive power pricing. In fact, operational costs attached to reactive power are often very small when compared to others costs. An effort to best allocate this part, by ignoring the others, does not pay. This is the main limit of methods based on nodal equations (see for example [14] ). They usually fail to incorporate capital costs, or lack a sound basis for doing SO.
By contrast, cost sharing rules are (i) based upon a methodology that accounts for all the costs of the system and (ii) usually derived along a precise axiomatic approach. This may explain why their use is encouraged by [10] . Several contributions have applied cost sharing rules in the context of power system (See, among others, [7] ). Unfortunately, it is often done by considering only some dimensions of the power system, hence part of the total costs. Most of the nice properties of the cost sharing rules are lost in this inappropriate usage. In this paper, we are very careful to account for all the costs of the power system. Moreover, we make explicit the properties of the cost-sharing rule we use by coming back to its axiomatic foundations.
Central in our approach is the concept of "fairness", which is briefly introduced here (a more detailed analysis is provided in a companion paper [IDI]. To display clear-cut results, we use a basic radial system with one generation area. It is also assumed that power and voltage are set optimally, and that voltage is within the required range (say 5% p.u. margin). Even for such a basic system, it appears impossible to decide for the fairness of a reactive power pricing rule without considering the overall cost of the system. Moreover, standard penalty rules may easily yield electricity pricing to fail to comply with our basic fairness requirement. Our companion paper [11 I] exhibits an allocation method that overcome this weakness. We illustrate its application for a distribution system of industrial loads that display two distinct power factors. We compare it to the outcome of the penalty system of two energy suppliers, one in North America, the other in Europe.
II. ISOLATING THE COSTS OF REACTIVE POWER Absent adequate reactive power pricing, market liberalization may yield important drawbacks, as warned by [12] [14] ). We illustrate hereafter (some of) the fundamental difficulties attached to isolating the costs of reactive power.
Assume that the system operates under optimal power flow conditions and let circuit elements be delineated in per unit values. The latter implies that transformer rates are removed and the reference voltage is identical over the whole system. Voltage drops as attached to the various positions in the network can easily be tracked. Let Uj be the effective node voltage. Active and reactive power losses in transmission lines and transformers depend upon the resistance R, and the reactance Xi through the loss coefficients for transmission systems yj and -y,! as defined by I% U2and
Observe that, for a properly designed (and well operated) power system, all voltages are within the 5% p.u. margin. Thus, a characterization of transmission by the coefficients -yj and -yý as computed with the reference voltage U = 1 (rather than with the effective voltage U 1 ) may provide a good approximation to compute both losses and generated power. Consider a radial system with main transmission parameters _YTO and -y*, distribution system parameters _YTi and -y* and sub-transmission (feeder or service lines system) parameters -yýand -yb i, where i = 1 ... n indexes the buses and j =-.. m the users per bus. To avoid cumbersome notations, we shall assume that the network is actually a chain and that there are only two users per bus (mi = 2, all i =1 ... n). The extension of the formulas to the general case is straightforward and left to the reader. Starting from the downstream bus up to the generation bus, one may compute recursively net real and reactive powers PNj and QNi to satisfy demand. More precisely, the net real power PNi writes
PNi
PNI±1+l
where PNi±1 is the net power delivered to the previous (downstream) bus, Equations (2) to (6) define respectively the demand of users, the losses in the main transmission system, the losses in the auxiliary transmission system (feeder), the power needed to cover the losses in the downstream system and the losses attached to this very same losses. Similarly, the net reactive power QNi is given by
where QUsers, QI.T, Ql.auxT, QI.m.T and QUI.IaT are defined by formulas similar to, respectively, (2) to (6). More precisely, wherever applicable, one should substitute in (2)-(6) reactive power Q for active power P, active power P for reactive power Q; similarly the losses coefficients -y and -y* are also to be exchanged. Operation costs can be derived by using the net power at the generation bus, PNg. It is fairly reasonable to assume the generation costs to be linear in PNg, at least for a given range Table I . Nucleolus allocation is point A of operational parameters. Thus, let the total costs be defined as
where F accounts for all non-variable costs. It is plain that: " Real and reactive power are deeply embedded. As a result of (5) and (6), the net power at the generation bus PNg is not additively separable in P and Q. Thus despite the linearity Of C (ZL) in PNg, operational costs cannot be decomposed as a sum of costs attached to the real power and costs attached to the reactive power. " Non-variable costs cannot be unambiguously attributed to active or reactive power either. According to [10] , the costs of installed generation capacity may be impossible to split. Moreover, while VAR compensation is directly related to reactive energy support, it does increase real power transfer capability; hence tangibly affects real power transit and the overall costs of the system. To sum up, a decomposition of the total Costs C (ZL) into a sum of costs attached to real power Cp (ZL) and costs attached reactive power CQ (ZL) would be nothing but unfounded. We are thus bound to look for a sound pricing approach based upon the sole total costs and yet accounting for both dimensions of the services, namely active and reactive power. We tackle this next. Before to do so, however, a criteria is introduced as to judge for the appropriateness of a pricing rule.
"FAIR" PRICING

A. Fairness Assessment
Consider a power system with sending end voltage U supplying effective total power Si to users characterized by power factor cosok,. Let Zi (Rj, Li) describe the associated users' load. Given the load profile ZL =(Z 1 ,,.., Z"), it is possible to define the optimal flow. We assume that the system is run in steady state at optimum and denote C (ZL) the associated total cost. In this paper, we focus on the sole pricing methods such that users exactly cover all the costs. In other words, we consider only cost-sharing methods, as defined by a vector of non-negative contributions %F' (.) such that %Pn C ) Z
A basic fairness condition requires that no group of users pays more than its stand-alone cost, iLe. what the group would have to pay if its constituents were the sole users of the power system. Formally, let C (ZG) be the "stand-alone" cost of group G, where ZG is the load profile such that 11 Z 11 = +00, all G (and Zk, all k E G unchanged). We want that
iEG Under (9), this is equivalent to
Z: %P'i(W,Z) >_C(Z) -C(Z-G) alliG, iEG
where Zc is the load of the complementary group of users. This says that no group G is a burden to the others. Clearly, our fairness requirement is also a necessary and sufficient condition for "voluntary participation". If either (10) or (11) is violated, some users would find advantageous to leave the system and/or to exclude others from accessing it. It follows that our fairness criteria can also be interpreted as a stability requirement.
In the game-theoretic literature, a vector of contributions %P' is said to be in the core if and only if it satisfies both (9) and (10) (11) ). This concept which goes back to Edgeworth (1881) was formally introduced by Gillies [15] . A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an allocation to be in the core is that users' contributions "Ti are higher than (or equal to) marginal costs C (Z) -C (Z _i). Characterization of the core for radial power systems, including conditions for non-emptiness, may be found in our companion paper [11I].
B. Fair Reactive Power Tariffs
When possible, it is convenient to analyze pricing methodologies by decomposing the cost sharing function %F (.) into two components, namely, one associated to real power and the other to reactive power. Ideally, one would write 4Pi A,±i +-ý, where the sum of Ais is assumed to cover the cost of real power CP (ZL) while the sum of 4,is is supposed to cover the cost of reactive power service (and capacity requirement) noted CQ (ZL) . Formally, this yields two different cost sharing problems to deal with: n On the one hand, it makes very much sense to tackle the two cost-sharing problems in a distinct manner, hence to consider them as completely separate problems. In fact, as already mentioned, the cost structure of reactive power is very peculiar. The variable (or operational) costs attached to reactive power services are usually considered to be very small when compared to the fixed (or capacity) costs. This is to be accounted for when sharing the Costs CQ (ZL).-On the other hand, however, there are two fundamental difficulties attached with this approach. First, as already mentioned, it is far from obvious to split even the sole fixed costs .F of the power system into fixed costs attached to real power services.Fp and fixed costs attached to the sole reactive power services.FQ. Second, the combination of pricing formulas that appear desirable when considering each cost-sharing problem separately, may not be desirable when considering the problem as a whole. Conversely, a sound cost-sharing function *P (.) may be such that either or both elements of its decomposition may appear completely awkward. In particular, one can show that, even if A (.) is deemed to he "fair" according to the "core criteria", there is no reason for %F (.) to inherit this property, unless 4ý (.) is also "fair" according to this same criteria. It is also plain that imposing both A (.) and 4ý (.) to obey (10) and (12) or (13) respectively is much more demanding than requiring 'P (.) to obey (10) and (9).
In this paper we take the view that what matters is the fairness of pricing "as a whole". We thus look at reactive power pricing through the lens of the (total) cost sharing function %P.
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
A. Core of Cost-Sharing Games: the Power Case
Cost allocations 'P are n-dimensional vectors. Since we restrict our attention to pricing schemes that exactly cover the costs, we know in addition that E71 xi ~ = C (Z) . A natural representation of 'P is thus to be found in the mapping of the cost shares (%Pi/C (Z)) in the simplex An 1
For illustrations, we set n = 3 (See circuit in Fig. 3) . The simplex A3 is of dimension two. More precisely, it is the convex hull of the equilateral triangle of height 1 (See Fig. 2 ).
An allocation 'P is a point in A 3 . Each vertex Of A 3 is associated to a user. The distance of the point 'P to the opposite edge is the cost-share supported by this user. If 'P is on a vertex, the associated user bears all the costs. The electrical system is deemed to be very simple as to better display the properties of the problem at hand. As evidenced in our companion paper [11] , for the just introduced radial power system, the (set of allocations in the) core is a triangle. In case A, all three users consume the same power Po .... 270kW and display an identical power factor PFh = 0.9. In case B, all three users consume three times more, with an unchanged power factor. In case C, users have a consumption identical to the reference case A but their power factor is much lower. More precisely PF 1 =0.7. Case D introduces a double asymmetry across users: they differ in both their real power and their power factor, although total power is identical to the reference case. The cost function is derived by assuming that the generation 
B. Nucleolus of the Cost-Sharing Game
If the core is non-empty, a very attractive allocation method is provided by the nucleolus of the cost-sharing game. This concept was introduced by Schmeidler [16] in the general context of a characteristic function game. As Littlechild El17], we consider its application in the particular context of a costsharing game. In loose terms, the nucleolus is the allocation 41' which maximizes the gains from common use of the power system for the group of users that gains the least. In the particular context of scrutiny, it takes a very simple form detailed in [11I]. Indeed, the nucleolus writes:
The latter formula follows from the particular structure of the cost-sharing game which is considered. It does not hold true in general. It has this nice property that, once they paid for their marginal cost, all users i E N contribute proportionally to their active power to the financing of the remaining deficit. The allocation was computed for cases A to D and plotted in figure 2 . It is the small triangle pointed to by an arrow. We illustrate fur-ther the concept in the following section where it is compared to tariffs proposed by different suppliers.
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE In this section, we illustrate the possibility to use the concept of "Nucleolus" as a (fair) methodology for pricing electricity. We calibrate distribution system parameters on the city of Sainte-Foy, Quebec, Canada, a residential area with about 70000 inhabitants. The distribution system represented in Figure 4 is set to supply electricity to up to approximately 128 small industrial users. Line impedance between buses is 0.0016 +0.0012i p.u. for 1.25km length (0.6kV, underground distribution system). Loss coefficients are easily derived. For this illustrative example we set the average power capacity of users to P =220kW. More precisely, there are 4 types of users with respectively 30, 70, 100 and 200% of that average power. We set the power factor to 0.7 and 0.9 to highlight possible effects of reactive power variations. Various generation parameters are considered in turm. For each of them, we compute the marginal costs of each users, the price that would follow from the "Nucleolus approach" and the price associated to some actual tariffs as reported by Hydro-Qu~bec, Canada and EDF, France in [ 18], [19] . More precisely, HydroQuebec displays Clearly, given the Hydro-Qu~bec pricing scheme, and given the assumed conditions, some users appear to pay less than the (marginal) costs they induce on the system (see Fig. 5) . In other words, they are a burden to the others. This says that the associated allocation is outside the core. Tariffs are clearly unfair.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper a fairness criteria has been introduced and illustrated. A fair pricing rule, according to the basic criteria introduced, should take into account all costs. Pricing reactive power in isolation appears to be both unrealistic and non sensical. A simulation evidences that actual tariffs as proposed
I Nudeoimis
4-
by different suppliers may yield to prices below the marginal cost of some users. An axiomatic approach is proposed that complies with our fairness criteria. We apply it to allocate costs of electricity for industrial users. This analysis may be helpful to assess the pricing methodology in electrical markets.
